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Both Executive Power Vesting Clauses and clauses equivalent to Article II’s Faithful Execution
Clause were prevalent in early state constitutions that nonetheless fractured gubernatorial control
over state bureaucracies. Originalist defenders of a unitary executive reading of the federal
Constitution nonetheless dismiss the interpretive significance of the pre-1787 state constitutions.
These early texts supposedly paid only lip service to separation of powers principles, while
presenting the Framers chiefly with examples of government structure to avoid. The core problem
with this originalist stance is that state constitutions written in the first decades after 1789
persisted in using the same clauses, now found also in Article II, to describe state governments in
which governors continued to lack unitary control. Close study of the state constitutions and state
administrative practice under them thus belie any “unitary executive” reading of Article II that
purports to be based on “original public meaning.” These findings are also consistent with the
early history of federal public administration, which corroborates a common understanding that
Article II’s vesting of executive power permitted substantial legislative control over the allocation of
decisional authority within the executive branch.
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INTRODUCTION
Debates about the President’s constitutional relationship to the federal
bureaucracy are as old as the Republic and show little sign of abating.
Proponents of what I would call the “hard version” of the unitary executive
thesis interpret the Constitution as guaranteeing the President plenary
authorities, which Congress may not limit, both to discharge unelected
executive administrators at will and to direct how they shall exercise any and
1
all discretionary authority that those officials possess under law. Dissenters,
of whom I am one, agree that the President enjoys such control over
subordinate personnel who assist the President in performing specific
constitutionally enumerated tasks, such as negotiating treaties or
commanding the military. We believe, however, that the scope of the
President’s removal and directive powers with respect to most administrators
2
is subject to congressional regulation. In this more pluralist reading of the
1

2

See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (describing the omnipotency of
the American presidency and why the other branches of government are subservient to
it).
See generally PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009) (explicating how the executive branch is limited by the
other two branches and why such limitations are an important facet of democracy).
Within what I would call this latter checks-and-balances camp, scholars further divide on
how to read administrative statutes. Some argue that, in the face of statutory silence, we
should presume that Congress intends the President to have both complete removal and
directive powers. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245 (2001) (delineating two ways to interpret an organic statute’s silence on delegation:
assuming it runs from Congress only to the agency official, or assuming that delegation is
still subject to the ultimate control of the President). This might be called the “soft
unitary executive” thesis. Others argue—again, I am in this group—that, even if a
removal power is presumed (a presumption that may be overcome by the nature of the
official’s particular tasks per Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958)), a directive
power should not be. See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the
Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 277 (2006) (arguing that the President has statutory
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Constitution, a President may have authority to persuade an official to
exercise her lawful administrative discretion in ways the President favors; if
the administrator demurs, however, the President has to live with the
disagreement unless the administrator is legally subject to policy-based
removal and the President is willing to remove that official.
With few exceptions, proponents of a hard unitary executive defend
their reading of the Constitution on purportedly originalist grounds. It has
been argued, for example, from a variety of historical sources that the hard
version of the unitary executive is what the Framers or ratifiers intended and
that we are bound by their intentions. The primary—in my judgment,
fatal—problem with the argument from original intent is that early
administrative practice was often at odds with this vision of the presidency.
As Jerry Mashaw has written, the First Congress “seems to have had no fixed
3
general idea about the relationship of the President to administration.” It is
odd to think that our earliest legislators, many of whom helped to draft the
Constitution, were either unaware of original intentions or indifferent to
them.
A somewhat different strategy of originalist interpretation, however,
relies less on a search for intent per se and more on what “new originalists”
call the “original public meaning” of the Article II text.4 Under this
approach, what would make the hard version of the unitary executive
binding is not what Framers or ratifiers might subjectively have had in mind,
but rather what a contemporary educated reader of the Article II text would

3

4

authority to direct administration of laws under statutes only when that statute grants
power to the President in name); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President
in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (questioning whether Congress’s
grant of authority to the President confers the ability to made administrative decisions or
simply oversee agency decision processes).
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Governmental Practice and Presidential Direction: Lessons from the
Antebellum Republic?, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 668 (2009) (arguing that based on early
government administrative statutes, it is clear that Congress did not have a singular
definition of the roles of the President and administrative agencies).
For example, it was on the basis of its understanding of “original public meaning” that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit would have held that the
President’s recess appointments power may be exercised only during the Senate’s
intersession recesses and only to fill vacancies first arising during those recesses. Noel
Canning v. N.L.R.B., 705 F.3d 490, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct.
2550 (2014) (“In context, ‘the Recess’ refers to a specific state of the legislature, so
sources other than general dictionaries are more helpful in elucidating the term's
original public meaning.”). Although affirming the Court of Appeals on a different
ground—namely, the brevity of the period of adjournment at issue—the Supreme Court
rejected the Court of Appeals interpretation on both these points. The Court concluded
that the Recess Appointments Clause was too ambiguous to yield a persuasive originalist
interpretation.
N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) (“The
constitutional text is . . . ambiguous. And we believe the Clause’s purpose demands [a]
broader interpretation.”).
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have taken it to prescribe. The hard version of the unitary executive, in this
view, follows from the original public meaning of the Article II declaration
that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America,” read either in isolation or as contextualized by other key
clauses of Article II. This reading is rooted in a syllogism: “Executive
power,” in the late eighteenth century, meant “not legislative” and “having
5
the power to put in act the laws.” Vesting “the” executive power meant
vesting all of executive power as a singular, indivisible authority. Vesting
that authority in “a” President meant that it would be shared by no other
individual.
In 2003, Professor Saikrishna Prakash provided a thoughtful and learned
defense of this reading, purporting to show how the textualist syllogism
makes sense of other portions of Article II and is corroborated by more
contextual evidence from eighteenth century political theory, debates in
Philadelphia and during the ratification period, and statements by George
Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Justice James Wilson
6
following the founding. His historical exploration leads him to conclude
that the federal Article II Executive Power Clause not only allows presidents
to direct those inferior officers charged with carrying out the law, but
actually authorizes the federal Chief Executive to “execute any federal law by
7
himself.” His position would go a long way toward establishing a hard
5

6

7

Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 716
(2003) [hereinafter Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power] (quoting 1 SAMUEL
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 684 (4th ed. 1773)). Professor
Prakash has further elaborated upon his views in SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH,
IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE 1–11
(2015) [hereinafter PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE]
(defending the plausibility of discerning a clear conception of the Article II presidency by
analyzing eighteenth century usage).
See Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 5, at 713–42 (exploring the
textual foundations for the chief executive thesis). His newer work argues that late
eighteenth century usage substantiates a widespread understanding that federal
“executive power” referred to the “execution of federal law, management of foreign
affairs, and direction of executive officers.” PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 63, 80. He also offers a somewhat different
formulation—a “bundle of powers—over law execution, foreign affairs, and the military.”
Id. at 68. At a high level of generality, I do not disagree and even endorse Professor
Prakash’s general position that the Executive Power Vesting Clause is properly
understood as implying some grants of power beyond the precise terms of the rest of
Article II. But, as Professor Prakash acknowledges, “[T]here were disagreements [in
eighteenth century America] about the scope of executive power.” Id. at 66. Where
Professor Prakash and I differ is in our views as to which aspects of executive power fell
within “widespread understanding” and which aspects were subjects of “disagreement,” or
simply not well-conceptualized at the time.
Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 5, at 704. In two respects, the
article does not purport to be a full-throttle textualist defense of unitary executive theory.
First, Professor Prakash does not attempt to “fully explicate what is meant by presidential
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version of the unitary executive; it would recognize a presidential power to
make every act of the federal executive establishment quite literally his own.
Although Professor Prakash’s work repays close reading, it remains
unpersuasive for two main reasons. The first, which I will not dwell on at
any length, is that early attorneys general with very different political
ideologies seem to have taken the precisely opposite view on the very point
Professor Prakash stresses:
Attorneys General [William] Wirt and [Roger] Taney were ideological
opposites concerning the true institutional seat of democracy in the
United States. Wirt placed it in Congress; Taney in the President. But,
both agreed that the President could not substitute his judgment for an
8
officer charged by statute with a particular function.

8

control of law execution,” id. at 705, thus perhaps leaving some ambiguity concerning the
scope of presidential entitlement with regard to controlling subordinate officers. Second,
in the 2003 article he does not deal with the scope of the President’s removal power, id. at
704–05, often regarded as another essential attribute of the “unitary executive.” As
Professor Prakash’s other work makes clear, however, his position on presidential removal
is complex and perhaps unique. He does not think Congress is constitutionally entitled
to create the “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative” offices that control the so-called
independent agencies. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 567–68 (1994) (arguing that non-executive
administrations do not exist because “no independent federal administrative officers were
ever contemplated by the Framers”). But he argues that—to the extent Congress does
create such offices—the President’s Article II removal powers do not extend to them. See
Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2006) (“[T]he
Constitution does not grant [the President] the authority to remove the quasi-judicial
and quasi-legislative officers who control the independent agencies. If the President’s
removal power arises from the grant of executive power, the President has far less
removal authority than is commonly supposed.”). If I understand this correctly, the
Prakash view of Article II would give the President authority to exercise personally all law
execution powers vested in any officer within the administrative bureaucracy, but power
to remove only those officers who were doing entirely “executive” work. For its part, the
Supreme Court has disavowed the utility of such formal labels for delimiting the scope of
the President’s removal powers. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988) (“[O]ur
present considered view is that the determination of whether the Constitution allows
Congress to impose a ‘good cause’-type restriction on the President’s power to remove an
official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely
executive.’”).
Mashaw, supra note 3, at 696. For Wirt’s views, see The President and Accounting Officers,
1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624 (1823) (opining that recourse from the settlement of public
accounts should be taken to the judiciary or Congress, not the executive department of
the government); The President and the Comptroller, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 636 (1823)
(refusing the President the power to intervene in the settlement of accounts before the
Comptroller); The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 678 (1824)
(prohibiting the President from interfering with the settlement of accounts of army
contractors); The President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 705 (1825) (“The
President cannot legally interfere with duties belonging to the accounting officers.”); The
President and Accounting Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 706 (1825) (The President cannot
legally interfere with the accounting officers whilst in the discharge of their duties.”). For
Taney’s views, see Jewels of the Princess Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 485–89 (1831)
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Indeed, based upon his own extensive research into the first century of
federal public administration, Jerry Mashaw regards as one of the few points
“settled” in the early decades a rule that presidents lack authority “to
exercise personally the statutory jurisdiction of an officer empowered by
9
Congress to make a particular decision or to take a particular action.”

9

(recommending the President order the district attorney to cease prosecution and return
the stolen jewels to the minister of the King of the Netherlands); Accounts and
Accounting Officers, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 507–08 (1832) (holding that the President does
not have “the power to enter into the correctness of the account” for the purpose of
fixing an accounting officer’s error). In his 2015 book, Professor Prakash argues that
Wirt’s position was wrong. See PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE,
supra note 5, at 190. I presume he would also take this position (i.e., that Wirt was
mistaken in his belief that the comptroller and his accountants were bound to have
latitude in practice) with regard to Taney. He does note, however, that Wirt’s view
actually echoes precisely the same position taken by President Jefferson in
correspondence addressing the issue. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin
Latrobe (June 2, 1808), in THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NATIONAL CAPITAL 429, 431 (Saul
K. Padover ed., 1946) (illustrating President Jefferson’s unwillingness to interfere with
the settlement of accounts with the Treasury as this was the legal job of the Comptroller).
See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 695. In support of a contrary view, Professor Prakash’s 2015
book mentions an incident during which President Washington appeared personally to
exercise all the legal powers vested in his cabinet secretaries because none was physically
present to do so. PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note
5, at 98. The actual story, however, may support only a more limited claim. The cabinet
officers were apparently out of Philadelphia because of the raging Yellow Fever epidemic
of 1793. From Mount Vernon, President Washington wrote to his Secretary of War,
Henry Knox: “The heads of Departments being absent the disputes arising between the
agents of the Powers at War, and other matters, are transmitted immediately to me.”
Letter
from
George Washington
to
Henry
Knox
(Oct.
15,
1793),
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-14-02-0151. It is not clear
what “other matters” encompassed. However, the President’s personal resolution of
disputes between agents of France and England, who were then at war, would seem quite
directly to implicate his foreign affairs powers—and might thus have had little relevance
to his supervision of ordinary domestic administration. Likewise, the epidemic posed so
extraordinary a challenge to administration that the President might have thought
himself constitutionally bound as Congress’s faithful agent to go beyond the literal terms
of statutes vesting authority in particular officers in order to achieve the larger purposes
of those statutes. A somewhat expansive view of his role as Congress’s agent would also
make sense of a 1796 episode in which President Washington, in violation of a statute’s
precise command, continued to direct the construction of ships even after the United
States made peace with Algiers, so that Congress would be able to reconsider the impact
of ending construction abruptly. See PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL
EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 94 (recounting President Washington’s construction of
warships despite statutory commands to stop construction). It was on just such an
implied agency theory that the Supreme Court many years later approved President
William Taft’s technical violation of a statute in order to give Congress time to reconsider
the potential impact of literal compliance. For an explanation of this theory, see United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 475 (1915) (finding that, as an agent of Congress,
the Executive was in charge of the public domain).
Nor is it instructive that President Washington personally directed the militia in enforcing
federal law. The authority for those actions presumably derived neither from the
Executive Power Vesting Clause, nor from his general faithful execution obligation.
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The second point, which this Article is the first to describe in detail, is
that similar executive power clauses were also deployed in state constitutions
before and after 1787, but the texts of those constitutions and state practice
pursuant to them reveal no agreement at all with the hard version of unitary
executive theory. To his credit, Professor Prakash takes due note of the pre1787 constitutions. But he dismisses their textual implications because,
“though all chief executives were vested with the ‘executive power’ or the
equivalent, in many states the executive power was exercised at the
10
sufferance of the legislature.” Consequently, Professor Prakash argues, as a
matter of federal Framer intent, “state executives were not the templates for
the federal chief executive. Rather, most state executives stood as reminders
11
of what to avoid.”
What is missing, however, from Professor Prakash’s reading of the texts is
recognition that post-1787 state constitutions took essentially the same
textual approach to structuring the executive branch as did the pre-1787
constitutions and federal Article II. In other words, for a textualist to dismiss
as Professor Prakash does the evidence of the early state constitutions, she
would have to argue two distinct propositions. First, the 1787 readers of the
draft federal Article II would have read the federal text as signifying
differently from the same words as used in the pre-1787 state constitutions.
Second, readers of the post-1787 state constitutions, which duplicated the
now-ratified language of federal Article II, would have understood the
identical clauses of the new state constitutions to operate more as they had
in state constitutions prior to 1787 than they would be expected to operate
under the federal Article II. It would take a highly counterintuitive theory of
communication to support such a convoluted hypothesis.
Because arguments for the hard version of the unitary executive are
almost always originalist, Part I of this Article explains in somewhat more
detail the premises of originalism in its formalist versions—both “original
intent” and its textualist cousin, “original public meaning.” Part II presents
the evidence from the texts of state constitutions roughly contemporaneous
with the U.S. Constitution. Part III examines state administrative practice
pursuant to the early constitutions to confirm that state legislatures acted
pursuant to the more relaxed idea of executive control than unitarians have

10
11

Rather, Congress, pursuant to Article I, § 8, had authorized calling state militia into
federal service for enforcing federal law, and President Washington, having triggered his
statutory authority, then acted pursuant to his explicit authority to act as “Commander in
Chief of . . . the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 98 (describing President Washington’s extensive
involvement in administrative matters).
Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, supra note 5, at 760.
Id. at 763.
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recognized. Part IV then shows how this pervasive understanding of the
fairly limited implications of executive power vesting clauses makes early
federal administrative practice much less surprising. The concluding
section explains why the syllogistic reading of Article II’s Executive Power
Clause does not belie the historical evidence, and urges that a persuasive
settlement of the unitary executive debate requires a nonoriginalist exercise
in constitutional construction. It suggests the practical factors on which
such a construction of the Constitution ought to rely.

I. VARIETIES OF ORIGINALISM
Originalism is a variety of constitutional interpretation that comes in
different flavors, some of which—if plausible—would be far more
constraining on interpretive judgment than others. After all, everyone
interpreting the Constitution is, in some sense, an originalist. Constitutional
arguments are invariably tethered to some textual hook and defended as
somehow consistent with the values underlying the text taken at an
12
appropriate level of generality. Enthusiasts of a hard unitary executive,
however, most frequently link their interpretation to one or another form of
originalism that is taken to be genuinely constraining. Indeed, judicial
13
constraint is widely taken to be originalism’s central value.
Old
originalism, which might also be called intent-based originalism, seeks to
find behind the constitutional text the founding generation’s expectations
for the application of that text. Perhaps the most glaring example of intentbased originalism in the Supreme Court is its reading of the Eleventh

12

13

See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011) (offering a view of the
Constitution “as an initial framework for governance that sets politics in motion, and that
Americans must fill out over time through constitutional construction”); Thomas B.
Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009) (arguing that while
originalists agree on the importance of looking to the text, how to operationalize the text
has been a point of disagreement).
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 46–47
(1997) (arguing that originalism precludes the use of evolving standards in constitutional
interpretation). To be “constrained” in constitutional interpretation, however, is not
necessarily the same thing as being “restrained” in the exercise of judicial power to
overcome the judgments of elected officials. See Keith E. Whittington, The New
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004) (explaining that defenders of the
“new originalism” take constitutional fidelity, not judicial restraint, to be the normative
value underpinning their methodology). For an intellectual history of modern-day
originalist theory, together with a supremely helpful analysis of disagreements within the
“family” of originalist approaches, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456 (2013) (explaining that, while all versions of
originalism share the ideas that constitutional meaning is fixed at the time of drafting
and ratification and that this meaning should constrain political officials, originalist
approaches may differ in many other respects).
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14

Amendment. In quite specific language, the Amendment does no more
than renounce jurisdiction over cases brought against states in federal court
by citizens of other states. The Supreme Court has held, however, that the
intent behind the Eleventh Amendment was to restore a tacit baseline
understanding among the Framers concerning the states and sovereign
15
immunity generally. In view of this imputed intent, the Court reads the
Constitution as not authorizing suits brought against a state, whether by its
own citizens or citizens of other states, and whether in state or federal
16
court. The only exceptions would be suits brought under federal statutes
enacted pursuant to congressional remedial powers added to the
17
Constitution after the Eleventh Amendment was ratified.
Critics of old originalism have discussed at length the difficulty of
finding a coherent collective intent behind a document, the legal status of
which reflects not only the handiwork of its drafters, but also the
18
expectations of the various state ratifying conventions. Old originalism has
also been critiqued as ironically inconsistent with the founding generation’s
19
preferred methods of interpretation.
Largely in response to these critiques, a new originalism has emerged,
which purports to be linked to the so-called “original public meaning” of the
relevant text. Original public meaning is said to be the meaning of the text
as it would have been understood by then-contemporary competent readers
in the population at large, as evidenced by dictionaries or other indicators of

14

15

16

17

18

19

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722 (1999) (“The text and history of the Eleventh
Amendment . . . suggest that Congress acted not to change but to restore the original
constitutional design.”); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1890) (“[T]he cognizance
of suits and actions unknown to the law . . . was not contemplated by the Constitution
when establishing the judicial power of the United States . . . . The suability of a State
without its consent was a thing unknown to the law.”).
See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (holding that Congress’s authority under Article I does not
encompass “the power to subject nonconsenting [s]tates to private suits for damages in
state courts”); Hans, 134 U.S. at 20–21 (holding that a state’s own citizens may not bring
suit against it in federal court without its consent).
See generally Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (allowing private causes of actions
against states when the cause of action is enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment).
See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 214 (1980) (“Therefore, an intentionalist must necessarily use circumstantial
evidence to educe acollective or general intent.”).
See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 887 (1985) (explaining that originalism emerged as a form of interpreting the
Constitution only during the administration of President John Adams).
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20

popular usage. New originalism resonates with old originalism in that its
advocates would insist that original public meaning is also the best evidence
of intent. But, in any event, to the extent there is an ascertainable original
public meaning, that meaning would presumably be what people voting on
21
ratification thought they were voting for or against.
Applying this—or actually, any—interpretive method to the unitary
executive debate is complicated in some easy-to-overlook ways. First, in
asking whether the Vesting Clause mandates a hard version of the unitary
executive, we are asking what that clause implies in answer to two questions:
Does the President have a constitutionally mandated power to remove at will
any and all officers of the executive branch? And does the President have
constitutionally vested authority to effectively carry out all statutory law
himself by dictating how every other officer in the executive branch
exercises his or her legally vested discretion? These are not questions that
can be resolved simply by ascertaining the literal or semantic meaning of the
words that the clause uses. It is a safe bet that no dictionary definition of
“executive power,” either in the 1780s or now, will define “executive power”
in a sufficiently unambiguous way to yield a determinate answer to the
question of the Vesting Clause’s legal effects. What we are searching for
might better be described as a “construction” of the clause—that is, a
resolution of any vagueness or ambiguity in the text’s semantic meaning by
resort to evidence other than the words’ acontextual communicative
22
content.

20

21

22

“[T]he new originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters of
constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that was adopted.”
Whittington, supra note 13, at 609. Prominent judicial examples of what purports to be
the method at work include District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and NLRB v.
Noel Canning, Co., 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592–618 (2014) (Scalia, J. concurring).
A fascinating complication has been introduced into the scholarly debate over new
originalism by evidence that a substantial number of voters in New York and Pennsylvania
were informed largely by versions of the Constitution that appeared in Dutch and
German translations, respectively. This introduces the prospect that, in important ways,
English-speaking and non-English-speaking voters during the ratification period may well
have understood the Constitution differently. See generally Christina Mulligan et al.,
Founding-Era Translations of the U.S. Constitution, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2016) (using
translations of the Constitution made at the founding to derive the meaning of the text as
understood by the translators).
On the relationship between interpretation and construction, see generally Solum, supra
note 13 (explaining that the indeterminacy of the constitutional text frequently requires
other interpretive tools besides strict construction, in which the plain meaning of the
text is simply translated). Professor Solum argues that “construction is ubiquitous—
constitutional practitioners always engage in constitutional construction when they apply
the constitutional text to particular cases or problems. . . . [T]he construction zone is
ineliminable; there is no convincing argument that any plausible approach to
constitutional interpretation will eliminate the underdetermination of constitutional
practice by squeezing more communicative content from the constitutional text.” Id. at
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Understanding the unitary executive debate in these terms, however,
highlights what Richard Fallon has identified as an ambiguity in what
23
scholars mean when they purport to identify “original public meaning.” He
persuasively shows how “legal meaning” might be understood in at least half
a dozen different ways, so that debates over interpretation can rest on
disagreement over which form of legal meaning counts and what the
relevant evidence shows once we have alighted on the right meaning of
“original meaning.” Of the “meaning[s] of legal ‘meaning’” that Professor
Fallon identifies, one seems most apt in capturing what “new originalism”
defenders of the unitary executive are arguing. That is, new originalists are
arguing for a construction of Article II that treats the “unitary executive” as
equivalent to the “[c]ontextual meaning [of the Vesting Clause] as framed
by the shared presuppositions of speakers and listeners, including shared
24
presuppositions about application and nonapplication.”
This coincides
with Professor Lawrence Solum’s statement of the “Public Meaning Thesis,”
namely, “that the communicative content of the constitutional text is
determined by the semantic meaning of the text as enriched by the publicly
25
available context of constitutional communication.”
Merely identifying old and new originalism, however, still leaves
unanswered many important questions about originalist interpretation.
26
Some questions have to do with the plausibility of the method and some

23

24
25

26

495. Experience, as well as the force of Professor Solum’s logic, persuades me that his
position is correct.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of
Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015) (emphasis added) (critiquing
textualism and originalism as unable to make consistent, categorical selections among
possible referents for claims of legal meaning).
Fallon, supra note 23, at 1246.
Solum, supra note 13, at 474. I suspect that Professor Solum would object to my
formulation as conflating his important distinction between “interpretation” and
“construction”; his statement of the “Plain Meaning Thesis” is, within his framework, a
statement about what the words convey (interpretation), not about the determination of
their legal effect (construction). But when defenders of the unitary executive thesis
argue from the original public meaning of Article II, their arguments are most readily
understood as equating the “communicative content” of Article II—which Professor
Solum links to its semantic content—with Article II’s proper “construction.” Indeed,
following Professor Solum, “original public meaning” originalism might better be called
“original public construction” originalism. See Solum, supra note 13, at 457 (defining
constitutional construction as “the activity that determines the content of the
constitutional doctrine and the legal effect of the constitutional text”). I believe,
however, or at least hope, that my restatement of the new originalist argument for the
unitary executive captures in at least a relatively clear and intuitively appealing way the
strategy of that argument.
See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST.
COMMENT. 71 (2016) (putting forth six different ways original public meaning could be
understood).

334

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19:2

with its normative underpinnings. That is, even if it were possible to identify
founding intent or original public meaning, it would still be debatable why
either should govern contemporary application of the Constitution. And, of
course, once one makes the move from interpretation to construction, one’s
approach to constitutional construction would also have to be normatively
justified.
For present purposes, this Article will not pursue in further depth either
the plausibility of, or normative questions surrounding old or new
originalism, but, in a sense, take each method as commonly understood. I
shall accept that a coherent search for original public meaning is possible
and can sometimes identify communicative content that is not, to use
another phrase of Professor Solum’s, “vague, ambiguous, gappy, or
27
contradictory.” What history shows, however, is that the semantic meaning
of Article II’s Executive Power Vesting Clause is at least the first two of those
things, and that the original construction of executive power vesting clauses
did not attribute to them the unitary executive as the original construction.

II. PUBLIC MEANING ORIGINALISM AND THE EARLY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
An original public meaning strategy for imputing a mandatory unitary
executive to Article II has to demonstrate that, in creating our separation of
powers system, the founding generation would necessarily have inferred
from the Constitution’s contextual meaning that a unitary executive is a
necessary corollary to the separation of powers. It might appear that the
threshold issue for such an approach would be identifying the words of the
Constitution that are relevant to the inquiry. Should we seek, for example,
the semantic meaning of the “vest[ing] of executive power?” Or is our
appropriate focus the original meaning of the vesting of executive power,
when combined with an explicit obligation to “take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,” or perhaps when combined with both the faithful
execution obligation and the right to demand the opinions in writing of
heads of executive departments?28 As it turns out, however, we need not
settle on a single focus because the early constitutions, with or without these

27

28

Lawrence Solum, Semantic and Normative Originalism: Comments on Brian Leiter’s “Justifying
Originalism,” LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Oct. 30, 2007, 1:30 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/
legaltheory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html; see also Solum, supra note 13, at 469–70 (“A
text is ambiguous if it can have more than one meaning . . . . The words ‘ambiguity’ and
‘vagueness’ are sometimes used interchangeably, but I am now referring to ‘vagueness’ in
the technical (or more precise) sense in which it refers to expressions that have
borderline cases.”).
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
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additional clauses, demonstrate that the unitary executive model was not the
29
original construction of the vesting of executive power in a chief executive.
For evidence of what these clauses meant to late eighteenth century
readers, I take as my evidence a set of early state constitutions roughly
contemporaneous with the Philadelphia draft. As I said earlier, one is
unlikely to find in any dictionary—then or now—a definition of “executive
power” that encompasses precisely what hard unitary executive advocates
claim. One does find the definition in Samuel Johnson’s dictionary, “having
30
the power to put in act the laws.” Such a formulation, however, leaves
ambiguous the key questions surrounding unitary executive theory, namely,
does the Chief Executive have comprehensive removal authority over all
subordinate administrators, and may the Chief Executive command those
administrators in their exercise of any discretion that the law gives them with
regard to government action?

29

30

To be clear, my position does not deny that the President enjoys some degree of
constitutionally-based supervisory authority over subordinate officers. To the extent
subordinate officers help in implementing specific powers vested in the President by the
Constitution, the argument is strong that the President’s powers of control over such
officers must be complete. For example, Professor Prakash and I would no doubt agree
that the Secretary of State could not be protected from at-will discharge. Likewise, I
assume the President must have complete control over the policy judgments entailed in
the implementation of any congressional authority to negotiate, for example, an
international trade deal. Further, even dissenters from the unitary executive thesis would
concur that the President’s faithful execution obligation, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, requires
that presidents have authority to dismiss administrative officers for dereliction of duty.
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988) (“[W]e [do not] think that the ‘good
cause’ removal provision at issue here impermissibly burdens the President’s power to
control or supervise the independent counsel, as an executive official, in the execution of
his or her duties under the Act. This is not a case in which the power to remove an
executive official has been completely stripped from the President, thus providing no
means for the President to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws.”).
My interpretive inferences are these: The Constitution does not guarantee the President
complete policy control over the implementation of statutes that do not directly implicate
his specific Article II powers. Because the Constitution, for example, gives the President
no authority over the economy, it is up to Congress how far the President may personally
be involved in controlling those administrators who implement statutes that Congress
enacts pursuant to its power to regulate commerce. The President undoubtedly has
entitlements to information, pursuant to the Opinions Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, CL.
1, and presumably some powers of coordination under the Vesting Clause. But whether
(a) presidents may personally exercise the functions Congress has vested in this class of
administrators, (b) command how such administrators exercise their policy discretion, or
(c) remove such administrators solely on grounds of policy preference, are matters
subject to congressional determination. These inferences are derived, however, not only
or even primarily from text, but rather from arguments rooted in institutional structures
and relationships and a general normative commitment to checks and balances. SHANE,
supra note 2, at 5–6 (defending checks and balances).
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 7, at 580 (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 684 (4th ed. 1773)).
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Dictionaries, at least in this instance, are hardly the best, much less an
exclusive source of interpretive guidance on questions such as these, which
really go to a text’s legal effect or operational consequences. A common
popular understanding of the significance of words in operation is most
likely to arise when the language at issue is in common use, and people can
observe in action the significance of the text in question. A common
hypothetical posed to students of statutory interpretation is whether a sign
banning “vehicles” in a park should be read as a bar to bicycle riding. If, in
any particular city, one observes that bicycle riding is common in parks
bearing such signs, one would likely conclude that, within such an
interpretive community, “vehicle” in the specific context of park signage
does not connote “bicycle,” irrespective of contemporary dictionaries. As it
happens, because language nearly identical to the federal Constitution
appears regularly in contemporaneous state constitutions, we can readily
investigate whether those documents and government practice under them
reveal what Americans who read the relevant clauses took them to imply.
The Supreme Court, when it pursues original public meaning, looks to state
31
constitutions for just such evidence.
Of course, any examination of the early state constitutions has to begin
by identifying the relevant documents. There is no fixed time frame within
which semantic understandings and their legal implications remain
relatively stable. For reasons of both plausibility and manageability, I have
thus focused on states admitted to the Union within fifteen years of the
drafting of the federal Constitution—in other words, by 1802. Then, even
though the United States comprised seventeen individual states by 1802, I
excluded Rhode Island. Rhode Island famously operated under its
32
seventeenth century charter until 1842, and documents drafted so remotely
from 1789 might not be trustworthy indicators of 1787–1789 meaning. For
the remaining sixteen states, I focused on the state constitutions drafted
most closely in time to the federal Constitution, except for six states that did
not draft post-Confederation Period constitutions until well into the
nineteenth century, if at all (Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
33
North Carolina, and Virginia). For those states, I included whichever of
their Confederation Period constitutions was drafted most closely to 1787.
31

32
33

See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600–01 (2008) (“Our interpretation
is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and
immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment.”).
Maureen McKenna Goldberg, Rhode Island’s Unique Constitutional History, 72 ALB. L. REV.
601, 602 (2009).
The constitutional texts on which I relied appear in 1-7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
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The one state for which this strategy did not yield a text drafted within
thirteen years of federal ratification is Connecticut, which continued to
operate throughout the Confederation and early national periods under its
34
1662 Charter. Its organic document closest in time to 1787 was its 1818
Constitution, which I did include in my sample. Here is the list of
constitutions thus reviewed and their dates of ratification:
CONNECTICUT
DELAWARE
GEORGIA
KENTUCKY
MARYLAND
MASSACHUSETTS
NEW HAMPSHIRE
NEW JERSEY
NEW YORK
NORTH CAROLINA
OHIO
PENNSYLVANIA
SOUTH CAROLINA
TENNESSEE
VERMONT
VIRGINIA

1818
1792
1789
1792
1776 (NEXT CONSTITUTION = 1851)
1780 (STILL IN OPERATION)
1792
1776 (NEXT CONSTITUTION = 1844)
1777 (NEXT CONSTITUTION = 1821)
1776 (NEXT CONSTITUTION = 1868)
1802
1790
1790
1796
1793
1776 (NEXT CONSTITUTION = 1830)

Including state institutions in the analysis from both before and after
1787 would seem to be a good thing from a public meaning point of view.
To the extent the federal Constitution employs language similar to its
forebears, we may infer that the Philadelphia drafters understood their
words to have similar import. To the extent post-Philadelphia state
constitutions use language similar to the federal Constitution, we can draw
inferences by looking at those state constitutions as to how the states
interpreted the words of the federal Constitution’s Article II. All in all, if
state constitutions consistently vest “executive power” in a governor, both
before and after 1787, and if the original public meaning of “executive
power” included unitary policy control over discretionary executive
functions, one would expect to find such functions located reliably within
governor-headed hierarchies in the states. One would also expect such

34

For an intriguing account of the debates that continued reliance on the Charter
engendered in Connecticut between independence and the ultimate calling of a
constitutional convention in 1818, see J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL, HISTORICAL NOTES ON
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF CONNECTICUT 1639–1818 (Hartford, Brown & Gross 1873).
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functions to be primarily accountable to the governor in the ordinary
working of state administration. On the other hand, if state constitutions
consistently vest “executive power” in a governor, both before and after
1787, but remove areas of public administration from gubernatorial control
(or allow state legislatures to do so), then we would likely conclude that the
vesting of executive power in a chief executive was not understood to entail
a hard version of a unitary executive. The latter pattern is the one that the
early documents reveal, both before and after 1787.
In fact, despite executive power vesting clauses, each of the sixteen
constitutions in the sample contemplates either a mandatory or permissive
legislative role in the appointment of officials involved in public
administration. In Connecticut, the state’s treasurer and secretary were
elected officials; the legislature appointed the state’s comptroller and
35
sheriffs. In Delaware, the state’s treasurer was appointed by the legislature;
the constitution reserved power to the legislature to prescribe methods of
appointment for “[a]ttorneys at law, all inferior officers in the treasury
department, election officers, officers relating to taxes, to the poor, and to
36
highways, constables and hundred officers . . . .”
Georgia’s constitution
provided for gubernatorial appointments of militia officers, secretaries of
the governor, and such inferior officers as the legislature might permit the
governor to appoint; by implication, all principal officers would be
37
appointed by the legislature.
The state legislatures of Kentucky, Maryland, and Pennsylvania
38
appointed those states’ treasurers. In New Jersey, a legislative council and
the general assembly together appointed the attorney-general, secretary, and
39
treasurer.
The South Carolina General Assembly appointed
“commissioners of the treasury, secretary of the State, and surveyor40
general.”
The legislature of Massachusetts appointed the “Secretary,
Treasurer, and Receiver-General, and the Commissary-General, Notaries
41
public, and Naval-Officers.” In New Hampshire, likewise, the legislature
42
selected the “secretary, treasurer, and commissary-general.” Moreover, the
governor shared his appointments powers with regard to other officers with
a popularly-elected five-member council, which could veto his

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, §§ 17–20.
DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, §§ 3, 6.
GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 2.
KY. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 7; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. VI,
§ 5.
N.J. CONST. of 1776, para. XII.
S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VI, § 1.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. II, § 4, art. I.
N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. Second, § LXVII.
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44

appointments. In New York, the legislature appointed the treasurer, and
the governor shared his appointment power with a council of four
45
Senators.
The North Carolina legislature appointed both that state’s
46
Attorney General and its Treasurer. The Ohio legislature appointed the
47
secretary of state, the treasurer, and the auditor. The Virginia legislature
48
appointed the state’s attorney general, secretary, and treasurer.
In
Tennessee, the Governor was assigned appointment authority with regard to
the adjutant-general of the militia, but the 1796 Constitution provided that
“[t]he appointment of all Officers, not otherwise directed by this
49
Constitution, shall be vested in the Legislature.” Vermont’s constitution
did not explicitly vest appointment power over administrators to anyone
other than the governor and his council. It envisioned, however, that the
legislature could itself decide to vest appointment power elsewhere. The
constitution vests the power of appointment in the governor and his council
for all “Officers, except where provision is, or shall be otherwise made, by
50
law or this Frame of Government.”
As described below, the Vermont
legislature proceeded to exercise such authority in a constitutionally
51
interesting way.
This pattern is all the more striking because, in ten of these states, the
constitutions explicitly and without qualification vested the “executive
52
power” or the “supreme executive power” of the state in a governor.
Presumably, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions were to
the same effect, although, rather than vesting executive power, they
53
denominated their governors to be “the supreme Executive Magistrate.” In
Virginia, the Governor exercised “the executive powers of government,” but
54
with the advice of a Council of State. The Maryland and North Carolina
constitutions provided that their governors could exercise “the executive

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53
54

Id. §§ XLVI-XLVII.
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXII.
Id. art. XXIII.
N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. XIII, XXII.
OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. II, § 16; id. art. VI, § 2.
VA. CONST. of 1776, paras. 35, 40.
TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. VII, § 5; id. art. VI, § 3.
VT. CONST. of 1793, chap. II, § 11.
See infra notes 100–103and accompanying text.
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 1; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 1; GA. CONST. of 1789,
art. XIX; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 1; N.J. CONST. of 1776, § VIII; N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
art. XVII ; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. II, § 1; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 1; S.C. CONST. of
1790, art. II, § 1; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. II, § 1; VT. CONST. of 1792, ch. 2, § 3.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. I; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. Second, § XLI.
VA. CONST. of 1776, para. 29.
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powers of government,” but noted that those powers could be limited by the
55
constitution or were to be exercised “according to the laws of [the] State.”
Yet even those state constitutions that arguably vested executive authority
with some linguistic ambiguity offer no solace to proponents of a hard
unitary executive reading of the federal Constitution. That is because these
are also five of the early constitutions in the sample that include explicit
commitments to the separation of powers that are actually stronger and
more categorical than any text in the federal constitution. Both Maryland
and North Carolina accompanied their 1776 state charters with Declarations
of Rights that, in nearly identical terms, affirmed “[t]hat the legislative,
executive and supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever
56
separate and distinct from each other.” The 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights
likewise provided that “the legislative and executive powers of the State
57
should be separate and distinct from the judicative . . . .”
Likewise,
according to the Constitution of Massachusetts:
In the government of this [c]ommonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; [t]he executive shall
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; [t]he judicial
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
or either of them; to the
58
end it may be a government of laws and not of men.

Most elaborately, New Hampshire provided:
In the government of this State, the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the
[l]egislative, [e]xecutive, and [j]udicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and
independent of each other, as the nature of a free government will admit, or as is
consistent with that chain of connection that binds the
whole fabric of the
59
[c]onstitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.

It would seem anomalous to treat the non-conforming appointments in
these states as evidence of a lesser commitment to the drafters’ own
conceptions of the separation of powers, when each of these states declared
its commitment to the separation of powers so emphatically—at least if we
are taking seriously the idea of “original public meaning.”
That non-conforming appointments are sanctioned in sixteen state
constitutions that vested executive power in a governor—often reinforced by
explicit commitments to the separation of powers—would seem to devastate
the thesis that the vesting of executive power is enough, by virtue of original
public meaning, to assure the Chief Executive unitary policy control over all
public administration. It remains to be considered, however, whether the
federal Constitution might be semantically distinct, however, because it

55
56

57
58
59

MD. CONST. of 1776, para. XXXIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, para. XIX.
N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, para. IV ; MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of
Rights, para. VI (using the same language as the North Carolina constitution, with the
exception of the word “supreme”).
VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 5.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XXX.
N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt.1, art. XXXVII.
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contains two other provisions that arguably yoke public administration to
the President personally. One is the requirement that the President “take
60
The other is that he “may
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
61
respective Offices.”
These inquiries, however, do not buttress the unitary executive thesis.
Governors in nine states are explicitly required to take care that the laws be
62
faithfully executed. In those states, it is obvious that the presence of an
express faithful execution obligation was not thought inconsistent with
giving state legislatures powers of appointment with regard to important civil
officers. It is arguable, moreover, that this figure understates the irrelevance
of faithful execution clauses to the unitary executive. That is because it is
unclear historically whether faithful execution clauses were intended as
sources of executive authority or rather merely as prohibitions against the
63
executive suspension of statutes. If the latter reading of such clauses is

60
61
62

63

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 9; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 13; KY. CONST. of 1792,
art. II, § 14; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. II, § 7; PA. CONST.
of 1790, art. II, § 13; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 8; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. II, § 10;
VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 11.
Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive
Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 90 (1983) (“[T]he Framers probably included the ‘faithful
execution’ clause in the Constitution to limit, not expand, the President’s power.”).
Professor Prakash has an unusual argument as to why, contrary to a common scholarly
view, the Faithful Execution Clause would not have been understood as a ban on the
suspension of statutes. He points out that the English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2
(Eng.), which barred the royal suspension of statutes, was enacted in 1689. Yet the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1682 already provided: “That the Governor and provincial
Council shall take care, that all laws, statutes and ordinances, which shall at any time be
made within the said province, be duly and diligently executed.” FRAME OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, art. VIII (1682). A 1682 colonial constitution obviously
could not have been derived from a 1689 parliamentary enactment. PRAKASH, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 93. If the Pennsylvania
Constitution were the model for Article II’s Faithful Execution Clause, then Article II
would also not have roots in the English Bill of Rights.
The problem with this argument is that a number of state constitutions were written
much closer in time to 1787, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, and they contained faithful
execution clauses, e.g., id. cl. XIX, that were at least as likely to be on drafters’ minds in
1787 as models for Article II. It is dubious to assume that drafters of constitutions written
in the 1770s would have understood the requirement of faithful execution to mean no
more and no less than it meant in 1682, notwithstanding the momentous developments
of 1689, which were of undoubted import to the colonists in understanding their liberties
as British subjects. Even without critically important intervening events, the passage of
time can alter what language signifies. When Thomas Jefferson spoke of the “pursuit of
happiness” in 1776, he probably meant something like the pursuit of excellence and a
virtuous life. Carol V. Hamilton, Why Did Jefferson Change “Property” to the “Pursuit of
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correct, it is notable that the four of the state constitutions that vest
administrative appointments in authorities other than the governor but omit
faithful execution clauses nonetheless expressly prohibit the executive
64
suspension of statutes. Under this view of faithful execution, thirteen of
the sixteen constitutions not only vest executive power in a governor, but
also impose a faithful execution obligation or its equivalent. There is little
here to buttress the notion that drafters of state constitutions equate the
vesting of executive power and the obligation of faithful execution of the
laws with hierarchical control of public administration directed solely by the
governor.
Nor does the picture change if we look at constitutions that entitle
governors to demand reports from other administrators. From my sample, it
appears as if the federal Opinions Clause may have been a new invention.
None of the six Confederation Period state constitutions in my sample has
its equivalent. Of the ten post-Philadelphia constitutions, drafters of which
might have consulted the federal text as an example, seven of these do
65
include equivalent provisions. The only difference is that each of these
texts, instead of entitling the respective governors to “opinions” in writing,
allows the governors to demand “information” in writing. All in all,
Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Tennessee provide seven examples of state constitutions roughly
contemporaneous with, but drafted later than, the federal Constitution that
all conjoin executive vesting clauses, faithful execution clauses, and the
equivalent of the federal Opinions Clause. Yet each of these state

64
65

Happiness”? HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 27, 2008), http://new.hnn.us/article/46460.
When twenty-first century politicians speak of the “pursuit of happiness,” they presumably
mean something quite different, even in quoting Jefferson.
Nor is it especially revealing that a state constitution might contain both a faithful
execution obligation and a ban on suspending statutes. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, art. XI;
id. ch. I, art. XVII. Constitutions are sometimes simply redundant. Cf. PRAKASH, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 193 (acknowledging that the
Opinions Clause is seemingly superfluous given the Executive Power Vesting Clause).
Indeed, if the Faithful Execution Clause is, as Professor Prakash suggests, not a ban on
the suspension of statutes, but an affirmative grant of authority to the President to
execute the law, the Faithful Execution Clause would seem to be a mere reiteration of the
meaning Professor Prakash already ascribes to the Executive Power Vesting Clause.
Moreover, even if the Vesting Clause did not already imply a requirement of fidelity to
law, which seems doubtful, the presidential oath to “faithfully execute the Office of
President of the United States” would seem to have fully covered the point. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. First, art. XX; N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. I, art. XXIX; N.C.
CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. V; VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § VII.
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 6; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. III, § 10; KY. CONST. of 1792,
art. II, § 11; OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. II, § 7; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 10; S.C.
CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 11; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. II, § 8.
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constitutions expressly assigns to the legislative branch at least some of the
66
appointing power with regard to significant administrative officers.

66

Not much is added to this analysis by an inquiry into gubernatorial removal powers. The
federal Constitution, of course, makes no mention of presidential removal power. This is
the pattern of most state constitutions as well, except insofar as they authorize
gubernatorial removals of judicial or militia officers on address by two-thirds of a few of
the state legislatures. In Delaware, the attorney general was subject to such removal by
address, but that constitution clearly implies that the attorney general is part of the
judiciary; that official is grouped, with regard to removal susceptibility, with “clerks of the
supreme court, prothonotaries, registers, clerks of the orphans’ courts and of the peace,”
all of whom are part of the judicial branch of government. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII,
§ 5. The only constitutions that explicitly contemplate a general gubernatorial removal
power are those of Maryland and Vermont. In Maryland, the Governor could “suspend
or remove any civil officer who has not a commission during good behavior,” with the
approval of the Governor’s Council, both the Governor and his Council having been
elected by the legislature. MD. CONST. of 1776, para. XLVIII. Vermont’s constitution
provided that “[e]very officer of state, whether judicial or executive, shall be liable to be
impeached by the General Assembly, either when in office, or after his resignation or
removal for mal-administration.” VT. CONST. of 1793, Ch. II, § 24. Uniquely, it went on
to prove that “[a]ll impeachments shall be before the Governor, or Lieutenant Governor,
and Council . . . .” Id. In every other state, impeachment was the prerogative of the
legislature.
Although what these texts imply for a governor’s authority to remove officers—and thus,
perhaps, to supervise their exercise of discretionary functions—is not entirely clear, the
implications seem to disfavor the unitary executive idea. For example, federal courts
have long assumed that, in the absence of any implicit or explicit statutory constraint on
the President, the President’s power of removal would be incidental to the power of
appointment. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259 (1839) (“In the absence of all
constitutional provision, or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and
necessary rule, to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of
appointment.”). If that is so, it would seem to follow that, where state constitutions vested
appointment authority in state legislators, they and only they would likewise have the
power of removal. Any gubernatorial authority over such officers would be limited to
what the respective constitutions might have provided or what the relevant legislatures
might have authorized by statute.
Some state statutes were a bit more detailed about official accountability to the
legislature. Kentucky, as noted above, was one of the states in which the legislature chose
the treasurer. That official, in turn, reported directly to a committee appointed by the
legislature. An early statute provided that the Kentucky treasurer “forfeit[ed] his office”
if he misapplied any funds, presumably upon a resolution of the legislature to that effect.
Acts of the General Assembly of Ky., Jan. Sess. 1798, ch. LXV, §§ 11–12. The Kentucky
Constitution contained no provision for the removal of delinquent officers by the
governor. The South Carolina Constitution of 1790 carried forward the provisions of the
state’s 1778 Constitution providing for the legislative appointment of the “commissioners
of the Treasury,” along with the attorney-general and other officers, subject to such
future changes as the legislature might enact. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VI, § 1; id. art.
VII. Not only does there appear to be no legal provision for the gubernatorial removal of
the two state treasurers—one in Columbia and one in Charleston—but these officials had
the duty to “instruct the attorney-general or solicitors, respectively, to
prosecute . . . defaulters” among the state’s tax collectors. Act of Dec. 19, 1801, 1801 S.C.
ACTS 1, 12. Thus, the supervision of tax collection—which we would today regard as
quintessentially executive—was in the hands of officials who reported only to the
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In sum, early state constitutions vested “executive power” in a governor,
but did not assign all administrative officers to a governor-headed executive
branch hierarchy. Critical executive functions are assigned to officers who
appear not to be accountable to state governors in the ordinary workings of
public administration. The most natural reading of these texts belies unitary
executive theory as a matter of original public meaning. As a theoretical
matter, however, it is hypothetically possible that the evidence thus amassed
might actually buttress, rather than undermine, a unitary reading of the
federal Constitution. The next Part of this Article explains—and refutes—
this argument.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE UNDER THE EARLY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
A counterargument to Part II’s reading of the early state constitutions
could run as follows: The original public meaning of an Executive Power
Vesting Clause, either alone or in combination with the Faithful Execution
and Opinions Clauses, would have dictated a unitary executive
interpretation in the late eighteenth century, unless qualified by other
clauses. The fact that all the early state constitutions provide expressly for
the legislative appointment of various officers might demonstrate that,
absent such explicit provisions, the state legislatures would have been
required under original public meaning to acknowledge an exclusive
appointment authority in the governor—as well as the removal and
supervisory authorities for which unitary executive advocates argue. Because
the federal Constitution does not provide for the legislative appointment of
various officers, it would follow, under this theory, that the unitary executive
67
construction of that document is the right one.

67

legislature. They, in turn, could “direct” the filing of suit, which we would today typically
classify also as an executive function.
In sum, the early state constitutional texts pertaining explicitly to removal powers
generally do not add anything to an original public meaning argument for a unitary
executive in the states, but the topic is generally left to implication, as it is in the federal
Constitution.
From our correspondence, I take this to be Professor Prakash’s position:
The unitary executive claim is not that the vesting of executive power necessarily
cedes control over the public administration of the law. . . . [C]onstitutions can
modify that rule as by granting for cause removal constraints or by implying that
those vested with executive power cannot direct. The [unitary executive] claim is
that the U.S. Constitution has no such constraints and that Congress cannot
modify the President’s power to serve as “constitutional executor” of the law any
more than it can modify the President’s pardon power.
Email from Saikrishna Prakash to Peter M. Shane (June 20, 2016, 10:43 EST) (on file with
the author).
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To be sure, even on its face, such an argument seems problematic. One
would have to accept, for example, that the drafters of a state constitution
such as New Hampshire’s—which denominated the governor the “Supreme
68
Executive Magistrate” and declared that the legislative and executive
branches “ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each
69
other, as the nature of a free government will admit” —nonetheless
understood that they were violating the separation of powers principle by
permitting legislative appointment of the state’s “Secretary, Treasurer, and
70
Commissary-General.” The argument requires us to infer that the drafters
of New Hampshire’s constitution were self-consciously self-contradictory.
The project of unitary executive originalism is even more conspicuously
doomed, however, by a closer investigation of the administrative tasks state
legislatures assigned outside gubernatorial control and how state legislatures
understood their discretion in providing for the appointment of public
administrators.
Such an investigation reveals that state legislatures
frequently went beyond the express terms of state constitutions in assigning
executive functions to persons outside executive control. To the extent state
constitutions gave legislatures specific roles in the appointment of officials
involved in public administration, legislatures did not regard these grants of
authority to be narrow exceptions to a general principle of unitary executive
control. They took them to be evidence of a different baseline principle,
namely, legislative authority to design of the institutions of government and
even to attenuate gubernatorial control over administration.
To evaluate fully the evidence in this respect, it is important to note that
the early state constitutions—though they all permit legislatures to choose
one or more significant state officers—treat the subject of appointments in
rather different ways, as documented in the Appendix below. For example,
the Georgia, Ohio, Tennessee, and Vermont constitutions all give their
respective legislatures wide authority over the appointment of administrative
officers. Georgia reserves to the legislature the selection of nearly all
principal state officers, while giving that body the authority also to permit
inferior officers to be chosen by “the governor, the courts of justice, or in
71
such other manner as they may by law establish.” The Ohio constitution
allows generally for the appointment of civil officers not named in the
72
constitution to “be made in such a manner as may be directed by law.” The
Tennessee constitution vests appointment authority in the legislature for all

68
69
70
71
72

N.H. CONST. of 1792, pt. II, § XLI.
Id. pt. I, art. XXXVII.
Id. pt. II, § LXVII.
GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 2.
OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VI, § 4.
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The Vermont
officers “not otherwise directed by [the] constitution.”
constitution also implies legislative authority to provide by law, at its
discretion, for the appointment of officers not otherwise covered by the
74
constitution.
Wide
Legislative
Authority
over the
Selection of
Administrative
Officers
Georgia
Ohio
Tennessee
Vermont
Massachusetts*
New Hampshire*

Legislative
Authority
over the
Selection of
Specific
Administrative
Officers

Gubernatorial
Authority
Over the
Selection of
Specific
Administrative
Officers

Explicit
Residual
Appointment
Authority in
the Governor

✔

Delaware
Kentucky
Maryland *
New York*
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Connecticut
New Jersey
North Carolina
Virginia

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

* With the consent of a council.
By way of contrast, the Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions
specify certain officers to be appointed by their respective legislatures and
yet other specific officers to be chosen by a governor and council.75 Yet

73
74

75

TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. VI, § 3.
VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 11. It might be inferred that the North Carolina legislature
had similarly broad authority to attenuate the governor’s supervision of public
administration; that constitution allowed the governor to “exercise all the other executive
powers of government, limited and restrained as by this Constitution is mentioned, and
according to the laws of the State.” N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX (emphasis added).
MASS. CONST. of 1780, Ch. 2, § 1, Art. IX, and § 4, Art. I; N.H. CONST. of 1792, Part
Second, §§ XLVI, XLVII.
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neither makes any express provision for civil officers other than those
named in the constitution.
A third set of constitutions vests in state legislatures the appointment
authority regarding specific state officers, while explicitly placing the
residual appointment authority over all other offices in the governor.
Examples include Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland (with consent of a
council), New York (with consent of a council), Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina.76 Yet a fourth group vests in state legislatures the appointment
authority regarding specific state officers, but say nothing at all about the
appointment of state civil officers not named in the constitution. These
include Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia. The table
above captures these groupings.
Legislative decisions in the first group of states to attenuate the
governor’s control over administration are less immediately on point for our
inquiry because the constitutions in those states explicitly direct or at least
permit the legislature to provide for administrative appointments outside
the executive branch. In other words, except in an interesting way discussed
below, the fact that legislatures in these states took administrative authority
out of gubernatorial hands might not reveal much about those legislatures’
understanding of separation of powers principles; they were mostly
exercising powers that their constitutions explicitly conferred. But—and
this is definitely instructive—state legislatures in the other groups went
beyond the explicit grants of legislative appointments power that their
constitutions authorized and provided by statute for what I have called nonconforming appointments, that is, appointments by authorities other than
the governor of civil officers wielding what would seem today obviously to be
executive power. Examples exist even in states whose constitutions gave
governors broad residual authority to make appointments to officers not
covered by the constitution.
For example, Massachusetts had one of the two constitutions that (1)
specified certain officers to be appointed by its legislature and yet other
specific officers by a governor and council, but (2) made no any express
provision for civil officers other than those named in the constitution. In
1802, when the legislature wanted an authoritative determination of the
boundary line between Massachusetts and Rhode Island, it appointed those
77
commissioners by statute.
The legislature did not treat gubernatorial
appointment as an implicit mandatory default.
76

77

DEL. CONST. of 1792, Art. II, § 8, Art. VIII, § 3, and Art. VIII, § 6; KY. CONST. of 1792, Art.
II, § 8, and Art. VI, § 7; MD. CONST. of 1776, Arts. X, XIII, XLI, XLVIII; N.Y. CONST. of
1777, Arts. XXII and XXIII ; PA. CONST. of 1790, Art. II, § VIII, Art. V, § V; S.C. CONST. of
1790, Art. VI, §§ 1 and 2.
Act of Mar. 8, 1791, ch. 22, 1791 Mass. Acts 91.
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The Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia constitutions
say nothing at all about the appointment of civil officers other than those
named by the constitution. Yet the legislature of each enacted nonconforming appointments. For example, in 1784, Connecticut provided by
78
statute for the appointment of state’s attorneys by the county courts. This
practice persisted until at least 1854, notwithstanding the adoption of the
79
new Constitution in 1818.
As recounted earlier, the Connecticut
Constitution of 1818 not only vested the executive power in the governor,
but required the governor to take care that the laws be faithfully executed
80
and gave the governor the equivalent of Opinions Clause authority. There
was no provision in the 1818 article on the judiciary independently
authorizing the judicial appointment of prosecutors.
Connecticut’s practice of judicial appointments for prosecutors persisted
in the face of a separation of powers system worded identically in relevant
respects to the federal Constitution. A North Carolina statute of 1777
likewise empowered county courts to appoint additional prosecuting
81
attorneys.
New Jersey, for its part, authorized the licensing of taverns and inns by
82
“the courts of general quarter sessions of the peace.” It directly appointed
“commissioners for laying out, opening and improving a road to
83
accommodate travelers.” Connecticut likewise provided for the licensing
84
of taverns by county Courts of Common Pleas, and the Virginia legislature
85
also appointed road commissioners. None of the legislatures in this group
treated the specific provisions for non-conforming appointments in their
constitutions to be exclusive, narrowly drawn exceptions from a legislative
obligation to vest appointment authority in a governor.
Perhaps, however, most telling in this respect is the existence of nonconforming appointments even under state constitutions that appeared to
78
79

80
81
82
83

84
85

THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 10–11 (John D. Cushing ed., 1982).
A post-1854 statute appears to have reorganized the courts. Subsequent references to the
judicial appointment of prosecuting attorneys place the power with “superior” courts.
CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 11, § 35 (1866). Connecticut retained some form of judicial
involvement in the appointment of state’s attorneys until 1985. See 1985 Conn. Acts 1379
§ 142 (repealing CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. tit. 51, § 51-278(a), and giving the power to
appoint the chief state’s attorney to the criminal justice commission’s administrative
head).
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
1 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 311, § LXVIII (John D. Cushing ed.,
1984).
Act of Feb. 24, 1797, ch. 438, 1796 N.J. Laws 180.
Act of Mar. 10, 1795, ch. 535, 1794 N.J. Laws 1022; see also Act of Feb. 15, 1794, ch. 462,
1793 N.J. Laws 891 (listing the appointments of multiple commissioners to lay out, open,
and improve roads).
1792 Conn. Pub. Acts 437.
Act of Jan. 11, 1809, ch. 55, 1808 Va. Acts 61.
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give their governors significant residual appointment authority with regard
to civil officers. Road commissioners were appointed directly by the
86
87
88
89
legislatures of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, and South
90
Carolina.
In creating central banks for their respective states, the
legislatures of South Carolina and Kentucky were all but indifferent to
executive oversight of those institutions. The President and board of
directors of the Bank of South Carolina were selected entirely by the
91
legislature, and the Bank reported its account to the legislature.
The
enacting legislation placed a number of restrictions on the Bank’s
operation, but made no provision for their enforcement by the governor.
There was even less direct state control over the Bank of Kentucky, half the
directors of which were elected by private stockholders and half by the
92
legislature.
The governor was permitted to inspect the Bank’s books
93
whenever he so requested, but had no other direct legal authority over the
institution. In short, even under constitutions that envisioned broad
appointing authority in the governor, legislatures still inferred they had the
power to place certain administrative tasks in the hands of persons the
governor did not appoint and control.
As I said earlier, it is not surprising to find non-conforming
appointments in states like Georgia, Ohio, Tennessee, or Vermont, given
that their constitutions envision broad legislative authority over
appointments. But even they provide corroborating authority of a sort. Of
the four, only Tennessee required the legislature to appoint all officers not
otherwise provided for in the state constitution.94 Georgia, Ohio, and
Vermont could have restricted non-conforming appointments—for
example, grants of appointment authority to the courts—to strictly judicial
officers.
That would have shown a baseline commitment to an
understanding of the separation of powers consistent in principle with
unitary executive theory. But no such pattern exists. For example,
notwithstanding Georgia’s explicit constitutional commitment to the
separation of powers, county judges were authorized to appoint local
86
87
88
89
90
91

92
93
94

Act of Jan. 28, 1803, ch. 138, 1803 Del. Laws 301.
Act of Dec. 22, 1806, 1806 Ky. Acts 134.
Act of Dec. 30, 1791, ch. 82, 1791 Md..
Act of Apr. 10, 1792, ch. 60, 1792 N.Y. Laws 360; Act of Apr. 9, 1804, ch. 96, 1804 N.Y
Laws 530.
Act of Dec. 21, 1798, 1798 S.C. Acts 13.
Bank of the State of South Carolina Act, §§ 17, 63–64 (1812) in 1 AN ALPHABETICAL
DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 56, 58, 65 (Joseph Brevard ed.,
Charleston, John Hoff 1814).
Bank of Kentucky Act, § 8, in 1 A DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAW OF KENTUCKY 139, 140
(William Littell & Jacob Swigert eds., Frankfort, Kendall & Russell 1822).
Id.
TN. CONST. of 1796, Art. VI, § 3rd.
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95

tobacco inspectors. When new roads were to be opened or altered, the
relevant Georgia statute empowered the courts to appoint three-person
inspection teams to examine the grounds urged to be cleared or altered and
96
report to the court. The legislature also inferred it had authority to vest
administrative tasks unrelated to the adjudication of cases in the courts, not
the state executive branch. County courts had licensing and regulatory
97
authority over taverns; clerks of county courts registered brands and
98
marks; and county courts regulated roads (including the administration of
99
applications to build new or amend existing roads). The Ohio legislature
likewise assumed it could assign nonjudicial administrative functions to the
courts, providing for the licensing by “the associate judges . . . of the proper
county” of ferries, taverns, and stores selling “any merchandise other than
100
the growth or manufacture of the United States.”
Like Georgia and Ohio, the Vermont legislature took advantage of its
implicit authority to provide by statute for the non-gubernatorial
appointment of officials, but did not limit those appointments to officials
doing only non-executive tasks. For example, the legislature itself appointed
101
members of several committees to “lay out . . . public highway[s].” State’s
attorneys—one in each county—were appointed by the legislature (and
102
reappointed or replaced each legislative term).
Not only did the state’s
attorneys prosecute “all matters and causes” on behalf of the state, but they

95

96

97
98
99
100

101
102

Act of Feb. 2, 1798, in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 683–84 (Robert
Watkins & George Watkins eds., Philadelphia, R. Aitken 1800) [hereinafter DIGEST OF
THE LAWS OF GEORGIA]. Lest it be objected that the statutory provisions in question were
enacted prior to the 1798 Georgia constitution discussed in text, it should be recognized
that the 1777 Georgia constitution likewise declared a separation of powers, GA. CONST.
of 1777, art. I, and the 1789 Constitution vested executive power in the governor, GA.
CONST. of 1798, art. II, § 1.
Act of Dec. 20, 1792 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 499. Georgia’s
system for road administration may not have been particularly effective, as the legislature
repeatedly amended it. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 4, 1789 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA,
supra note 95, at 386 (giving the superior courts full power and authority to order roads
be built); Act of Dec. 19, 1818, 1818 Ga. Laws 401–02 (requiring justices of inferior courts
to appoint three justices of the peace for erecting public roadways).
Act of Dec. 24, 1791 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 453–54. This
authority included fixing the price of liquor on a county-by-county basis.
Act of Dec. 8, 1792 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 456–57.
Act of Feb. 4, 1789 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 386; Act of Dec.
20, 1792 in DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 95, at 499.
Act of Feb. 1, 1805, ch. 8, 1804 Ohio Laws 96, 99. The legislature later vested this
authority in the “court of common pleas, of the proper county.” Act of Feb. 8, 1810, ch.
34, § 1, 1809 Ohio Laws 107.
Act of Oct. 27, 1795, 1795 Vt. Acts & Resolves 431.
Act of Nov. 10, 1797, ch. 83, § 1, 1797 Vt. Acts & Resolves reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF VERMONT OF A PUBLICK AND PERMANENT NATURE 556, 556 (Wm. Slade, Jr. ed.,
Windsor, Simeon Ide 1825).
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were also empowered to enforce monetary penalties issued by state courts.
Although the state’s attorneys were appointed by the legislature, they were
in some measure supervised by the courts, which certified the statements of
accounts that state’s attorneys were required to submit to the treasurer, who
104
in turn submitted them to the legislature.
One reaction to this evidence is that I might simply have identified a host
of specific administrative tasks—surveying, financial management, civil and
criminal prosecution, tavern licensing, road administration, tobacco
inspection, and so on—that were not uniformly understood in the late
eighteenth century as inherently executive in a constitutional sense. But this
reaction would not be a riposte; it would underscore my point. The original
public meaning of executive power was either vague, ambiguous, or both.
The vesting of executive power—even the vesting of executive power
coupled with faithful execution obligations and the right to demand
information from subordinates—did not imply in virtually any of the states a
constitutional entitlement of governors to supervise a unitary executive
branch.
Understandably, there was little early litigation over gubernatorial
appointments and removals to shed further light on the states’ firstgeneration understandings of their new constitutions. A rather striking
example, however, comes from Pennsylvania, the constitution of which
provided: “[The governor] shall appoint all officers whose offices are
established by this Constitution, or shall be established by law, and whose
105
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . . .”
An early
Pennsylvania decision affirmed that the governor had the power to remove
106
from office the inspector of salt provisions for the city of Philadelphia.
The court reached its conclusion after interpreting Congress’s Decision of
1789 as an endorsement of presidential removal power under Article II,
which it took to apply at least as powerfully under the Pennsylvania
constitution to imply a gubernatorial removal power. The court, however,
explicitly recognized the legislature’s power to limit removal by statute: “As
to the tenure of ministerial offices in general, there can be no doubt but it is
during pleasure, unless the law by which the office is established, order it
107
otherwise.”
Moreover, a nearly contemporaneous decision of that state’s

103
104
105
106
107

Id.
Id.
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 8.
Commonwealth ex rel. Reynolds v. Bussier, 5 Serg. & Rawle 451, 462 (Pa. 1820).
Id. at 460–01 (emphasis added). To be fair, this line, standing alone, might not imply a
judicial understanding that the legislature could limit removability. A statute with tenure
“at pleasure” might have been read to imply an indefinite term, unlike statutes that might
specify a specific term of years. Yet even statutes with specific terms could have been
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supreme court indicated that—notwithstanding the categorical language of
the Pennsylvania constitution—the legislature could reserve the
appointment of some administrative officials to itself or assign appointing
108
authority to persons other than the governor.
In thus going beyond the express terms of state constitutions that
authorized non-conforming appointments explicitly, legislatures (and
apparently at least one court) did not regard these grants of authority to be
narrow exceptions to a general principle of unitary executive control. They
regarded them as corroborating legislative powers to design the institutions
of government and even to attenuate gubernatorial control over
administration. “Executing the law” appears to have meant something like
“executing the law to the extent and in the manner prescribed by the
legislature.” Insofar as the state constitutions shed light on the original
public meaning of the language of Article II, they show that a proper
construction of the relevant words did not connote a constitutional
109
command for a unitary executive branch.

IV. OLD ORIGINALISM: THE CASE OF THE NATIONAL BANK
Prior to the advent of the “original public meaning” version of
constitutional originalism, the theory of the hard unitary executive was
typically advanced on original intent rather than semantic grounds. Indeed,
the notion of “original public meaning” divorced from original intent has
110
not gone unchallenged among originalists.
Early federal administrative
practice, however—the kinds of administrative practice I have explored in

108

109

110

understood at that time to leave the power of executive removal at will intact. I am
grateful to Professor Prakash for pointing out the ambiguity.
Commonwealth ex rel. Lehman v. Sutherland, 3 Serg. & Rawle 145, 149 (Pa. 1817)
(“[T]here are matters of temporary and local concern, which, although comprehended
in the term office, have not been thought to be embraced by the constitution. And when
offices of that kind have been created, the legislature have sometimes made the
appointment in the law which created them, sometimes given the appointment to others
than the Governor, and sometimes given the power of removal to others, although the
appointment was left to the Governor.”).
I should also say that, in making this argument, I decided to forbear from relying on the
many examples of state constitutions and statutes providing for the state legislative
appointment of local administrative officers; such examples also betoken a fracturing of
state administrative authority. I have not pursued the point only because the varying
practices with regard to the appointment of local officials might be thought to reveal the
different state and federal understandings of the vertical dimensions of public
administration, rather than different understandings of the separation of powers per se.
See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2009) (“[R]examin[ing] the shift from the subjective intent of
the constitution-makers to the ‘original public meaning’ of the Constitution’s words.”).
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Part III with regard to the states—has always been a problem for the
unitarian version of original intent.
The interpretive touchstone for intention-based originalists would
presumably be evidence of authorial expectation for the application of the
founding text. There is inevitable ambiguity as to which authors count—the
drafters or the ratifiers. But we can at least imagine the possibility that the
drafters’ text effectively communicated their intentions to the ratifiers or
that, through speeches or supplementary texts, these intentions were
conveyed accurately to voters whose affirmative ballots endorsed them. In
any event, it is no surprise that, among intention-based originalists, the
111
debates and output of the First Congress enjoy a special pride of place.
Not only would that Congress be closest in time and thus most attuned to
the contemporary meaning of the Philadelphia text, but many Members had
actually helped draft the Constitution: eleven in the Senate (which
comprised twenty-one to twenty-six Members, depending on vacancies and
dates of election) and ten in the House, membership in which ranged from
112
fifty-nine to sixty-five Members.
Among the House Members was James
Madison, who presumably would have been an authoritative source of
intelligence about Framer intent. This is a group whose behavior might be
thought an accurate mirror of Framer/ratifier intentions.
The problem for original intent unitarians is that the First Congress’s
handiwork regarding the structure of the initial administrative departments
seems to belie the idea that the Framers intended a hard version of a unitary
113
executive.
For example, although the President was given significant
flexibility and control when it came to the new Departments of War and of
111

112

113

See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926) (“We have devoted much space to this
discussion and decision of the question of the presidential power of removal in the First
Congress, not because a congressional conclusion on a constitutional issue is conclusive,
but first because of our agreement with the reasons upon which it was avowedly based,
second because this was the decision of the First Congress on a question of primary
importance in the organization of the government made within two years after the
Constitutional Convention and within a much shorter time after its ratification, and third
because that Congress numbered among its leaders those who had been members of the
convention. It must necessarily constitute a precedent upon which many future laws
supplying the machinery of the new government would be based and, if erroneous, would
be likely to evoke dissent and departure in future Congresses. It would come at once
before the executive branch of the government for compliance and might well be
brought before the judicial branch for a test of its validity.”).
On the members of the First Congress, see 1st United States Congress, WIKIPEDIA (visited
Sept. 23, 2016), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_United_States_Congress; Birth of the
Nation: The First Federal Congress, 1789–1791: An Online Exhibit by the First Federal
Congress Project, http://www.gwu.edu/~ffcp/exhibit/p1/members/.
See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 293 (2012) (arguing that early
notions of the unitary executive do not comport with twenty-first century proponents of
unitary executive theory).
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Foreign Affairs (which shortly became the Department of State), this was not
114
The Attorney General had no department at
so regarding the Treasury.
all and questionable authority over the part-time U.S. Attorneys, who were
affiliated loosely with the Department of State and who supported
115
themselves largely through the private practice of law. Again, to quote the
work of Jerry Mashaw:
Congress created commissions and boards outside of any of the major
departments to oversee the Mint, to buy back debt of the United States,
and to rule on patent applications. Because these commissions and
boards were made up of already existing officers of the United States,
Congress in effect appointed the officers by the same legislative act that
created their offices. From this perspective these were “independent
commissions” in an even stronger sense than those we recognize today.
Some of these ex-officio commissioners could be replaced by the
President by replacing the officers. But other Boards of Commissioners
contained non-removable officials like the Chief Justice and the
116
President of the Senate.

Congress’s eclecticism in fashioning different administrative structures with
different lines of accountability to different sources of supervision could
hardly have been more conspicuous.
Another insufficiently-appreciated blow to the old originalist case for a
hard unitary presidency is the First Bank of the United States. Separation of
powers theorists have largely ignored the Bank, presumably because, as a
kind of public-private partnership, it so obviously does not fit comfortably
within any traditional view of the administrative state. Although she does
not mention it specifically, the Bank seems to be an early example of the
kind of “boundary” agency that Anne O’Connell shows has never been fully
117
accounted for in administrative law scholarship.

114
115

116
117

Id. at 40.
Id. at 43; see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice:
Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014)
(“Until 1854, each Attorney General maintained a substantial private practice, and many
did not even live in Washington, D.C. Until 1819, the Attorney General did not even
have his own clerk, and until 1821, an office.”). Professor Prakash has argued, however,
that the records of early administrations show that Presidents Washington, Adams, and
Jefferson all believed they were constitutionally entitled to direct the activities of district
attorneys. Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 553–63
(2005). Because Congress never purported to regulate presidential practices in this
respect, this history does not substantiate that the Constitution guarantees the President a
prosecution-directing role, only that—absent congressional limitation—Presidents
thought they were not violating the law by ordering that prosecutions commence or
desist, and none of the early Presidents’ directives was sufficiently controversial on the
merits to arouse resistance.
MASHAW, supra note 113, at 43–44.
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 914 (2014).
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Yet there is no doubt the Bank wielded government power. Professors
Walter Dellinger and H. Jefferson Powell—at the time of their writing the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”)
and his former deputy, respectively—have observed that a modern-day OLC
opinion on the constitutionality of a national bank would have focused
118
The
immediately on possible separation of powers objections to the bill.
Bank may be inconvenient for originalist defenders of a unitary presidency,
but it can hardly be ignored as irrelevant.
As Professor Mashaw recounts, the Bank of the United States—strongly
urged by Framer Alexander Hamilton and modeled after the Bank of
119
England —effectively regulated the money supply. As Mashaw explains:
The statute authorizing the Bank provided a charter and specified
the total capitalization of the enterprise. It also provided voting rules for
stockholders, limits on total debt and the amount of interest to be
charged, and a limit on the subscription to be made to the Bank by the
federal government. But all of the Bank’s operating policies—including
when and where to establish branches—were left to the regulations to be
adopted by the Bank’s directors, only a minority of whom would be
120
selected by the United States.

The precise degree of government influence in the selection of the
directors of the First Bank of the United States is difficult to measure.
Directors were to be chosen according to a plurality of shareholder votes,
and the United States was limited to subscribing to no more than a fifth of
121
the Bank’s stock. Although the number of votes given to each shareholder
122
depended on a complex formula, the United States bloc was presumably
large enough to be influential, although the statute was silent as to who
would vote on behalf of the United States. The government’s minority
status was cemented, however, when the Bank was re-chartered in 1816.
Under the Second Bank Bill, the President was explicitly authorized to
appoint five of the Bank’s directors, with the Senate’s advice and consent,

118
119

120
121

122

Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney
General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 131 (1994).
Alexander Hamilton, Dec. 13, 1790 Report on a National Bank, in 1 REPORTS OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES, PREPARED IN OBEDIENCE TO THE ACT
OF THE 10TH MAY, 1800 75–76; see also JOHN THOM HOLDSWORTH & DAVIS R. DEWEY, THE
FIRST AND SECOND BANKS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 571, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
19–22 (1910) (demonstrating Hamilton modeled the Bank of the United States after the
Bank of England).
MASHAW, supra note 113, at 47.
See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, §§ 4, 11, 1 Stat. 191, 192, 196 (providing for election of
directors according to a plurality of voting shares and limiting the United States’
subscription to no more than two million dollars out of the Bank’s total ten million dollar
capitalization).
See id. § 7, 1 Stat. 193 (expounding on the apportionment of shareholder votes
throughout sixteen sub-parts).
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not even enough by themselves to constitute a quorum for doing business;
123
Under both
private shareholders would choose the remaining twenty.
statutes, the Treasury Department enjoyed some limited supervisory
authority over the Bank in the sense that the Secretary could demand
reports and inspect Bank records. There was, however, no provision for
124
presidential or Treasury authority to direct the bank in its operations.
What makes this example of attenuated presidential influence so telling
was that enactment of the Bank’s charter in 1791 was very much the subject
of constitutional debate. James Madison famously opposed the Bank as
going beyond the enumerated powers of Congress, recalling that the
Philadelphia Convention specifically declined to give Congress an express
power of incorporation precisely to avoid the establishment of a national
125
bank. The measure was debated vigorously in the House on constitutional
126
Nor did
grounds, even though unanimously approved by the Senate.
Congress’s adoption of the Bank bill end the intra-governmental
deliberations. President Washington, who, of course, had presided over the
Constitutional Convention, thought the issue of sufficient moment that,
prior to signing the Bank’s charter, he sought the formal opinions of his
Attorney General and Secretaries of State and of the Treasury on the
127
constitutional issue.
We thus have four major statements by leading
contemporary figures—Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, and Edmund
Randolph—all formally assessing the constitutionality of the bank bill.
Here’s the rub: Not one of these opinions mentions the separation of
powers as a source of objection or concern. Jefferson, Madison, and
Randolph all thought the Bank unconstitutional as going beyond Congress’s
Article I powers, but none says a word about the lack of presidential
supervisory authority or indeed anything about the Bank’s attenuated
accountability to even the Treasury Department. Hamilton does not
acknowledge the Executive’s attenuated influence over the Bank as

123
124
125
126
127

Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, §§ 8, 11, 3 Stat. 266, 269–71 (providing for election of
directors and establishing a quorum of seven).
MASHAW, supra note 113, at 47.
James Madison, Feb. 2, 1791 Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank, in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 1772–1836, at 480, 482 (1999).
PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 30 (6th ed. 2015).
Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 3 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 445 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed. 1904); Thomas Jefferson,
Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank, in THE FEDERALIST:
A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNTIED STATES BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
JAMES MADISON, AND JOHN JAY 651–52 (Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1898); Edmund
Randolph, Feb. 12, 1791 The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill, in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 3 (1999).
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something that needs to be constitutionally explained away. He does not
mention it at all.
Intent-oriented originalists might challenge the salience of this
argument in two respects. The first is that the relevant actors in both
Congress and the Executive might have failed to consider any separation of
powers issue because they deemed the Bank a private and not a
governmental entity, thus obviously beyond the President’s reach. Perhaps
it never occurred to the First Congress that the Bank’s directors and officers
might be thought Officers of the United States, subject by constitutional
command to presidential appointment, removal, and direction. To the
extent this speculation is accurate, however, it would only make the
originalist position weaker. It would imply that those most familiar with the
Constitution’s drafting and the ratification debates were unaware of any
authorial intent to confine the delegation of significant government
authorities even to purely government institutions. If that’s so—and I think
it is—then it must follow that there was no authorial intent to confine the
delegation of discretionary government authority exclusively to officials
whom the President could command and remove.
A second speculative riposte might be that separation of powers issues
were not raised because of the philosophical alignment of the principal
antagonists. As Mashaw points out: “Federalists . . . emphasized executive
leadership in ways that sometimes led their political opponents to brand
128
them monarchists.” The Virginians—Jefferson, Madison, and Randolph—
could conceivably have been reluctant to criticize the Bank for being under
insufficient presidential control because such control might have been as
problematic to the nascent Jeffersonian caucus in Congress as was
129
Congress’s extension of its implied legislative powers. Any “correction” for
the former problem would have rendered the Bank even less attractive in
their eyes. As for Hamilton and Washington, perhaps they noticed the issue
but were reluctant to mention it because, as nationalists above all, they
thought the Bank too important to cavil over matters of executive control.
(I suspect this latter scenario is deeply counterfactual, given that Hamilton’s

128
129

Mashaw, supra note 3, at 671–72.
This is not to say that this trio championed a weak presidency. Whether President
Jefferson’s own ambitious uses of executive power represented a change from his earlier
views of the presidency is the subject of debate. See Jeremy D. Bailey, The Republican
Executive: Thomas Jefferson and the Development of Presidential Power, in EXTRAORDINARY TIMES
1–4 (Stephen Dawson et al., eds. 2001) (supporting the proposition that Jefferson desired
the presidency be characterized by an energetic executive); John Yoo, Jefferson and
Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 421–25 (2008) (advocating the idea that President
Jefferson’s actions as President show that he was in favor of a strong presidency within the
limited framework of the federal government). On President Jefferson’s and President
Madison’s views of Article II, see Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 64–82.
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design for the Bank was always for a private institution; it is doubtful he
thought he was compromising any constitutional principle.) In any event,
since the Bank’s opponents raised no separation of powers arguments, its
supporters might also have felt no compulsion to raise any.
In this respect, however, it is enlightening to look at the Bank debate at a
later stage in history. As is well known, Congress failed to re-charter the
Bank when the first charter lapsed in 1811, leaving the U.S. to fight the War
of 1812 without the aid of a central fiscal institution. The resulting fiscal
130
difficulties prompted Congress in 1816 to charter a Second Bank of the
United States for another twenty years, again much to the chagrin of the
agricultural states. Congressional Whigs voted in 1832 to extend the charter
131
four years early thinking the move would help them in the 1832 election.
Instead, Andrew Jackson made his vehement opposition to the Bank a
central campaign issue and sent Congress a vigorous and detailed veto
132
message.
Key portions of Jackson’s message, reminiscent of earlier statements in
opposition to the Bank, again challenged the Bank as unconstitutional.
While taking note that the Supreme Court had approved Congress’s
exertion of an implicit incorporation power, Jackson took the position that
the Supreme Court had been appropriately deferential to the elected
branches in applying the Necessary and Proper Clause, but that he, as
133
President, need not be.

130

131
132

133

The First National Bank would have been insufficiently capitalized to lend the
government enough money to finance a war, and reliance on the First National Bank was
not the Monroe Administration’s plan. Its hope lay instead with the chartering of a
Second National Bank with much greater capital. The failure to recharter the Bank also
meant there were no national banks to convert bank notes into specie, resulting in a
proliferation of state currencies and the necessity for the Treasury Department to accept
private banknotes in payment of taxes—a process that required Treasury to have to
negotiate continually over the terms of exchange. See MAX M. EDLING, A HERCULES IN
THE CRADLE: WAR, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1783–1867, at 122–23 (2014).
BREST ET AL., supra note 126, at 77.
Veto Message from President Jackson Regarding the Bank of the United States (July 10,
1832), reprinted in JAMES D. RICHARDSON, ED., A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139–1154 (1897).
Id. at 1146 (“The principle [the Court] affirmed is that the ‘degree of its necessity,’
involving all the details of a banking institution, is a question exclusively for legislative
consideration. A bank is constitutional, but it is the province of the Legislature to
determine whether this or that particular power, privilege, or exemption is ‘necessary and
proper’ to enable the bank to discharge its duties to the Government, and from their
decision there is no appeal to the courts of justice. Under the decision of the Supreme
Court, therefore, it is the exclusive province of Congress and the President to decide
whether the particular features of this act are necessary and proper in order to enable the
bank to perform conveniently and efficiently the public duties assigned to it as a fiscal
agent, and therefore constitutional, or unnecessary and improper, and therefore
unconstitutional.”)
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Jackson did not doubt that the Bank was established to be an agency of
government. And, unlike his anti-Federalist forebears, he was no critic of a
strong presidency. On the contrary, modern advocates of a hard unitary
executive cite the Jackson Administration as a source of significant
134
Jackson was thus intellectually and politically well
precedents in support.
positioned to voice any available separation of powers attack on the Bank.
But Jackson—who had every reason to attack the Bank on any plausible
constitutional basis and who was, at that stage in history, our most proexecutive Chief Executive, did not object to the Bank on any separation of
powers ground. In a veto message exceeding 8000 words, the Bank’s
relationship to the Executive is mentioned only once:
The bank is professedly established as an agent of the executive branch
of the Government, and its constitutionality is maintained on that
ground. Neither upon the propriety of present action nor upon the
provisions of this act was the Executive consulted. It has had no
opportunity to say that it neither needs nor wants an agent clothed with
such powers and favored by such exemptions. There is nothing in its
legitimate functions which makes it necessary or proper. Whatever
interest or influence, whether public or private, has given birth to this
act, it can not be found either in the wishes or necessities of the executive
department, by which present action is deemed premature, and the
powers conferred upon its agent not only unnecessary, but dangerous to
135
the Government and country.

In other words, Jackson’s objections to the Bank on behalf of the
executive branch had nothing to do with his non-supervision of the Bank,
but rather to the reenactment of its charter under the Necessary and Proper
Clause without taking account of Jackson’s view that the Bank did not meet
appropriate tests of necessity and propriety. Had strong grounds emerged
between 1789 and 1832 to support a view of founding intent as mandating
the hard version of the unitary presidency, no one would have been likelier
to say so than Andrew Jackson. He did not. This is a revealing dog that did
not bark.
The National Bank example hardly exhausts the case against an intentbased originalist argument for a hard unitary executive. It dramatically
illustrates, however, “the limitations of . . . historical claims that the
relationship of administrations to the political and legal branches of
136
government was well-established early in the nation’s history.” As research
into both state and federal practice shows, public administration was
134
135

136

Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 1, at 95–104.
Veto Message from President Jackson, supra note 132, at 1152–53. It is worth noting that
my argument holds whether or not Jackson accurately understood the Bank to be a
government institution. My point is that he thought it was and yet failed to object to it on
separation of powers grounds.
Mashaw, supra note 113, at 11.
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frequently organized in ways that are inconsistent with the hard unitary
executive paradigm. Originalist defenders of a hard unitary executive are
thus left with arguing that the exceptions are inapposite, that the founding
generation did not actually understand its constitutional documents, or that
the texts of the documents were just lip service to principles that legislatures
governed by the late eighteenth century constitutions simply violated with
regularity. There is, of course, a simpler explanation—that the documents
were all but universally understood as giving legislatures substantial freedom
to organize public administration, including decisions to limit direct chief
executive control over administrative outcomes. Understood in this way,
history confirms Professor Mashaw’s conclusion: “The notion that we have
fallen in the modern era from some prior state of separation-of-powers
137
grace . . . is simply a mistake.”

CONCLUSION
The supposed appeal of original public meaning originalism is largely
two-fold. With respect to methodology, it purports to avoid the attribution
of intent problems often cited with respect to old-style originalism. On a
normative level, if the relevant text had a conventional, stable meaning at
the time of its use, then shared knowledge of that meaning would cause
those drafting the Constitution and those voting for and against it to possess
a common understanding of what they were collectively producing. It is this
imagined consensus that gives weight to the claim that modern readers of
the Constitution should treat the text as significantly constraining. With
regard to the vesting of executive power, original public meaning
originalism substantiates, at least as clearly as old-style original intent-based
originalism, that the founding generation did not have any “fixed general
idea about the relationship of the President [or a governor] to
138
administration.”
Skeptical readers may still think this argument gives too little weight to
the syllogism noted above. Does not the vesting of “the” executive power in
“a” President demand that executive power be treated as a single, indivisible
thing that may be assigned to no official other than the President? Given
Article I, it plainly does not. That is, the Constitution, as Professor Prakash
himself recognizes, “grants some eighteenth century executive powers—such
139
as the powers over war and foreign commerce—to Congress.” At the very
least, this implies that the Executive Power Vesting Clause needs to be read
as follows: “Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the executive
137
138
139

Id. at 25.
Mashaw, supra note 3, at 668.
PRAKASH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE, supra note 5, at 83.
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power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The
implicit Exceptions Clause might itself be regarded as a repudiation of the
hard version of unitary executive theory.
But even considered linguistically, the weight that unitarians attach to
“the” and “a” is simply too great. To see this, imagine that Article II opened
as follows: “Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.” The absence of any modifier preceding “[e]xecutive
power” could have easily signaled that executive power might also be vested
elsewhere—perhaps in the “officers” and “executive departments”
mentioned elsewhere in Article II—so long as those specific executive
powers constitutionally lodged with the President remained intact. If I am
right about this, then the notion of an indivisible executive power rests
entirely with the word, “the.”
Yet even a moment’s reflection reminds us that “the” is often used in a
manner that does not suggest singularity or exclusivity. Imagine that the
Constitution provided: “The dessert shall be the tastiest part of the
President’s dinner.” This would mean exactly the same as: “Dessert shall be
the tastiest part of the President’s dinner.” The use of the word “the” is
compatible with the notion of a dessert that is not a singular presidential
entitlement. Others may have dessert, too. Thus, unlike Article III, which
conveys to the courts not just “the judicial power,” but “the judicial power of
the United States”—a rather clear signal of comprehensiveness—Article II
can be read to permit the legislative allocation of executive power to
members of the executive branch other than the President. Even as to those
officers, of course, the President must “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.” But the President need not have power to execute the laws
personally. The President need not enjoy removal power at will in the face
of contrary statutes. The President need not have the authority to demand,
without firing an official, that the official exercise his or her discretionary
authority in the manner the President prefers.
This does not necessarily mean that a hard unitary executive reading of
the Constitution is unjustified; it simply cannot be justified adequately
through any narrowly formalist version of originalism. Whether the
Constitution commands a hard version of the unitary executive should be
understood as a question of nonoriginalist, albeit historically informed
constitutional construction. That construction, in turn, should be a
pragmatic one, taking due cognizance of a variety of considerations. These
would include the general values that animated the 1787 Constitution, our
now-more-than-two centuries of institutional practice, and what we have
learned and are still learning about the relationship of different institutional
arrangements to different kinds of institutional outcomes. Debates about
these factors are no more likely to yield broad consensus conclusions than
are debates over the meaning of historical texts. But that uncertainty is itself
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an argument for constitutional fluidity—for giving our political institutions
more, rather than less power to structure and restructure their
interrelationship. Absent compelling evidence, courts and originalist
scholars should be reluctant to bind the elected branches to any one highly
debatable view of the constitutional organization chart. Nothing in the
original public meaning of Article II requires us to do so.
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APPENDIX: STATE LEVEL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS IN EARLY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

Connecticut
1818
Delaware
1792

Georgia
1789

Kentucky
1792

Article Fourth. Of the Executive Department.
§ 19. A Controller of the public accounts shall be
annually appointed by the General Assembly.
Art. II, § 8. [The governor] shall appoint all officers
whose offices are established by this constitution, or
shall be established by law, and whose appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for . . . .
Art. VIII, § 3. The State treasurer shall be appointed
annually by the house of representatives, with the
concurrence of the Senate.
Art. VIII, § 6. Attorneys at law, all inferior officers in the
treasury department, election officers, officers relating
to taxes, to the poor, and to highways, constables and
hundred officers, shall be appointed in such manner as
is or may be directed by law.
Art. IV, § 2. All elections shall be by ballot, and the
house of representatives, in all appointments of State
officers, shall vote for three persons; and a list of the
three persons having the highest number of votes shall
be signed by the speaker, and sent to the Senate, which
shall from such list determine, by a majority of their
votes, the officer elected, except militia officers and the
secretaries of the governor, who shall be appointed by
the governor alone, under such regulations and
restrictions as the General Assembly may prescribe. The
General Assembly may vest the appointment of inferior
officers in the governor, the courts of justice, or in such
other manner as they may by law establish.
Art. II, § 8. [The governor] shall nominate, and by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint all
officers, whose offices are established by this
Constitution, or shall be established by law, and whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . .
.
Art. VI, § 7. The State Treasurer shall be appointed
annually by the joint ballot of both Houses.
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Maryland
1776

Massachusetts
1780
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Art. X. [The House of Delegates] may examine and
pass all accounts of the State, relating either to the
collection or expenditure of the revenue, or appoint
auditors, to state and adjust the same.
Art. XIII. That the Treasurers (one for the western, and
another for the eastern shore) and the Commissioners
of the Loan Office, may be appointed by the House of
Delegates, during their pleasure . . . .
Art. XLI. That there be a Register of Wills appointed
for each county who shall be commissioned by the
Governor, on the joint recommendation of the Senate
and House of Delegates . . .
Art. XLVIII. That the Governor, for the time being,
with the advice and consent of the Council, may
appoint the Chancellor, and all Judges and Justices, the
Attorney-General, Naval Officers, officers in the regular
land and sea service, officers of the militia, Registers of
the Land Office, Surveyors, and all other civil officers of
government (Assessors, Constables, and Overseers of
the roads only excepted) and may also suspend or
remove any civil officer who has not a commission,
during good behaviour; and may suspend any militia
officer, for one month: and may also suspend or
remove any regular officer in the land or sea service:
and the Governor may remove or suspend any militia
officer, in pursuance of the judgment of a Court
Martial.
Chapter 2, § 1, Art. IX. All judicial officers, the
attorney-general, the solicitor-general, all sheriffs,
coroners, and registers of probate, shall be nominated
and appointed by the governor, by and with the advice
and consent of the council; and every such nomination
shall be made by the governor, and made at least seven
days prior to such appointment.
Chapter 2, § 4, Art. I. The secretary, treasurer, and
receiver-general, and the commissary-general, notaries
public, and naval officers, shall be chosen annually, by
joint ballot of the senators and representatives, in one
room.
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Part Second, FORM OF GOVERNMENT, § V: And
farther, full power and authority are hereby given and
granted to the said general court . . . to name and settle
annually, or provide by fixed laws for the naming and
settling, of all civil officers within this State; such
officers excepted the election and appointment of
whom are hereafter in this form of government
otherwise provided for; and to set forth the several
duties, powers, and limits of the several civil and
military officers of this State.
§ XLVI. All judicial officers, the attorney-general,
solicitors, all sheriffs, coroners, registers of probate, and
all officers of the navy, and general and field officers of
the militia shall be nominated and appointed by the
governor and council; and every such nomination shall
be made at least three days prior to such appointment;
and no appointment shall take place unless a majority
of the council agree thereto.
§ XLVII. The governor and council shall have a
negative on each other, both in the nominations and
appointments. Every nomination and appointment
shall be signed by the governor and council, and every
negative shall be also signed by the governor or council
who made the same.
§ LXVII. The secretary, treasurer, and commissarygeneral shall be chosen by joint ballot of the senators
and representatives, assembled in one room.
Art. XII. [T]he Attorney-General, and Provincial
Secretary, shall continue in office for five years: and the
Provincial Treasurer shall continue in office for one
year; and that they shall be severally appointed by the
Council and Assembly . . . .
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New York
1777

North Carolina
1776

Ohio
1802
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Art. XXII. And this convention doth further, in the
name and by the authority of the good people of this
State, ordain, determine, and declare, that the
treasurer of this State shall be appointed by act of the
legislature, to originate with the assembly: Provided,
that he shall not be elected out of either branch of the
legislature.
Art. XXIII. That all officers, other than those who, by
this constitution, are directed to be otherwise
appointed, shall be appointed in the manner following,
to wit: The assembly shall, once in every year, openly
nominate and appoint one of the senators from each
great district, which senators shall form a council for
the appointment of the said officers, of which the
governor for the time being, or the lieutenant
governor, or the President of the senate, when they
shall respectively administer the government, shall be
President and have a casting voice, but no other vote;
and with the advice and consent of the said council,
shall appoint all the said officers; and that a majority of
the said council be a quorum.
Art. XIII. That the General Assembly shall, by joint
ballot of both houses, appoint /. . . [the] AttorneyGeneral, who shall be commissioned by the Governor,
and hold . . . office[] during good behavior.
Art. XXII. That the General Assembly shall, by joint
ballot of both Houses, annually appoint a Treasurer or
Treasurers for this State.
Art. XXIV. That the General Assembly shall, by joint
ballot of both Houses, triennially appoint a Secretary
for this State.
Art. II, § 16—A secretary of State shall be appointed by
a joint ballot of the Senate and House of
Representatives . . .
Art. VI, § 2—The State Treasurer and Auditor shall be
triennially appointed by a joint ballot of both Houses of
the Legislature.
Art. VI, § 4—The appointments of all civil officers, not
otherwise directed by this constitution, shall be made in
such manner as may be directed by law.
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Art. II, Sect. VIII. [The governor] shall appoint all
officers, whose offices are established by this
Constitution, or shall be established by law, and whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for . . .
Art. V, Sect. V. The State Treasurer shall be appointed,
annually, by the joint vote of the members of both
Houses. All other officers in the treasury department,
attornies at law, election officers, officers relating to
taxes, to the poor and highways, constables, and other
township officers, shall be appointed in such manner as
is or shall be directed by law.
Art. VI, § 1. The . . . commissioners of the treasury,
secretary of the State, and surveyor-general shall be
elected by the joint ballot of both houses in the house
of representatives. . . .
Art. VI, § 2. All other officers shall be appointed as they
hitherto have been, until otherwise directed by law . . .
.140
Art. V, § 2nd. The general assembly shall, by joint ballot
of both houses, appoint . . . an attorney or attorneys for
the State, who shall hold their respective offices during
good behavior.
Art. VI, § 3rd. The appointment of all officers, not
otherwise directed by this Constitution, shall be vested
in the legislature.

This section would appear to carry forward the relevant portions of the South Carolina
Constitution of 1778, which provided as follows:
XXIX. That two commissioners of the treasury, the secretary of the State, the
register of mesne conveyances in each district, attorney-general, surveyor-general,
powder-receiver, collectors and comptrollers of the customs and waiters, be
chosen . . . by the senate and house of representatives jointly, by ballot, in the
house of representatives . . .
XXXII. That the governor and commander-in-chief, with the advice and consent
of the privy council, may appoint during pleasure, until otherwise directed by law,
all other necessary officers, except such as are now by law directed to be otherwise
chosen.
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Chap. II, § 10. The Supreme Executive Council of this
State, shall consist of a
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and twelve persons,
chosen in the following manner, viz. The freemen of
each town shall, on the day of election for choosing
Representatives to attend the General Assembly, bring
in their votes for Governor, with his name fairly
written, to the Constable, who shall seal them up, and
write on them, Votes for the Governor, and deliver
them to the Representative chosen to attend the
General Assembly; and at the opening of the General
Assembly, there shall be a committee appointed out of
the Council and Assembly, who, after being duly sworn
to the faithful discharge of their trust, shall proceed to
receive, sort, and count the votes for the Governor, and
declare the person who has the major part of the votes,
to be Governor for the year ensuing. And if there be
no choice made, then the Council and General
Assembly, by their joint ballot, shall make choice of a
Governor. The Lieutenant Governor and Treasurer
shall be chosen in the manner above directed. And
each freeman shall give in twelve votes for twelve
Councillors, in the same manner, and the twelve
highest in nomination shall serve for the ensuing year
as Councillors.
Chap. II, § 11. The Governor, and in his absence the
Lieutenant Governor, with the
Council, (a major part of whom, including the
Governor or Lieutenant Governor, shall be a quorum
to transact business) shall have power to commission
all Officers—and also to appoint Officers, except
where provision is, or shall be otherwise made, by law,
or this Frame of Government . . .
Unnumbered para. 35. The two Houses of Assembly
shall, by joint ballot, appoint . . . [the] Secretary, and
the Attorney-General, to be commissioned by the
Governor, and continue in office during good
behaviour.
Unnumbered para. 40. A Treasurer shall be appointed
annually, by joint ballot of both Houses.

